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Setting Prices on Priceline
Chris K. Anderson
School of Hotel Administration, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853,
canderson@cornell.edu
Priceline is best known for its name-your-own-price format, in which consumers bid for services but not for ser-
vice providers. Because Priceline serves as an opaque selling mechanism, it attracts price-conscious consumers.
Sellers also beneﬁt because they can price into multiple market segments without worrying that they are dilut-
ing revenue they might receive from customers who are willing to use conventional selling channels and pay
more. A ﬁrm that releases its inventory to Priceline must manage the trade-off of pricing its inventory too low
(and forgoing revenue) versus pricing it too high and forgoing a sale. In this paper, we outline the mechanism
that Priceline uses to determine if customer bids are successful and, given this mechanism, establishes optimal
prices and inventory allocations for Kimpton Hotels.
Key words : dynamic programming; marketing: pricing, buyer behavior.
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Kimpton develops, owns, or manages 43 indepen-dent boutique lifestyle hotels in the United
States and Canada; its website, http://www.kimpton
hotels.com, includes a complete listing of its hotels
and details on each property. Kimpton takes a unique
approach to style and four-star service. Each of its
hotels has a distinctive energy and personality, and
offers distinguished restaurants and lounges, compli-
mentary wireless Internet access, hosted evening wine
hours, and great rates.
Many are located in urban business districts, and
most Kimpton guests are business travelers. Unlike
leisure travelers, business travelers tend to make
travel plans close to their planned arrival date—
generally fewer than 14 days before arrival. This short
reservations window means that Kimpton has little
time to recover from weak demand periods or peri-
ods in which reservations fall substantively below
forecasted demand. However, because many of its
guests are business travelers, Kimpton cannot offer
the large discounts that stimulate demand; doing so
would decrease rate yields from these business trav-
elers who would have booked a reservation without
the discount and are willing to use traditional book-
ing channels. Priceline’s opaqueness (i.e., consumers
do not know the service provider, such as the airline
or hotel, until they have paid for the service) provides
a natural method of segmenting business and leisure
travelers. Thus, it allows Kimpton to price into the
leisure market while not diluting its business market.
Kimpton releases rooms to Priceline to help increase
occupancy on days when forecasted occupancy is
low (i.e., <90–95 percent). However, it frequently
restricts the number of rooms released to maintain
customer perceptions within the marketplace; i.e., it
puts a cap on the number of rooms released, regard-
less of forecasted occupancy or revenue implica-
tions. Currently, Kimpton uses prices recommended
by its vendor-supplied revenue-management system
to determine how to set prices on Priceline. In the
following sections, we outline our efforts to improve
Kimpton’s Priceline price-setting process. We dis-
cuss how Priceline’s name-your-own-price (NYOP)
mechanism works, develop a model for setting opti-
mal Priceline prices, and discuss an implementa-
tion at a Washington, DC-based Kimpton hotel. Our
model develops a price-dependent arrival process and
extends the framework of Lee and Hersh (1993) to
include both setting optimal prices and allocating
inventory.
Online Pricing and Priceline.com
Pricing services, such as hotel rooms, rental cars, and
airline seats, online has dramatically changed how
307
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service ﬁrms reach customers; online travel sales were
expected to exceed ofﬂine (i.e., traditional) sales chan-
nels by 2008 (2008 data are not yet available). Ser-
vice providers initially reacted positively to pricing
online; they believed that it would provide them with
new channels to reach customers and thus enable
increased segmentation opportunities. However, over
time these service providers have tried to move cus-
tomers back to ﬁrm-managed distribution channels
(e.g., company websites and call centers) to control
sales costs and commissions, and maintain direct con-
tact with their customers to facilitate loyalty programs
and other marketing efforts.
In parallel with this migration to ﬁrm-managed
channels, service providers have tried to streamline
prices and create price parity (i.e., equivalent prices
for all booking methods) across all distribution chan-
nels. They believe that price parity instills trust and
comfort in customers because they do not need to
shop around for the best prices by a given service
provider. From the consumer’s viewpoint, online pric-
ing and online travel agents, such as Orbitz, Expedia,
and Travelocity, and metasites, such as Kayak, have
greatly simpliﬁed shopping because they allow easy
price comparisons. The opaque nature of Price-
line’s NYOP mechanism allows a service provider to
effectively post different prices simultaneously while
maintaining price parity on full-information-posted
price channels. Service ﬁrms look to use Priceline’s
NYOP process to stimulate price-sensitive demand
while not cannibalizing their existing sales. Cannibal-
ization is limited because, although prices on Price-
line are much lower than regular posted prices, the
customer does not select the service provider, and the
purchased product includes more restrictions (e.g., it
might not be refundable or transferable) than prod-
ucts purchased from other distribution channels.
Priceline presents two mechanisms to allow cus-
tomers to acquire services; the ﬁrst is similar to other
online travel agents in which a customer selects from
posted prices by multiple service providers; the sec-
ond allows customers to submit bids for services with-
out knowing the service provider’s identity (or certain
details of the service). In this paper, we concentrate on
the second Priceline mechanism.
Consider a customer who submits a bid for an
overnight stay at a three-star hotel in New York’s
midtown Manhattan, with an arrival date of
November 1st. Priceline determines if it can meet
the customer’s offer. If it rejects the offer, the cus-
tomer can alter the bid by changing an attribute,
such as changing three-star to four-star, midtown
to Times Square, or the arrival date. Alternatively,
the customer could rebid on the three-star hotel in
midtown after 24 hours have elapsed. Priceline’s
method of determining if a bid is acceptable is unique
and greatly favors the service provider. Following
a customer bid pc, Priceline creates a list of all n
qualifying properties, e.g., all three-star or better
hotels in midtown Manhattan. It then randomly
selects one of these qualifying properties (each has an
equally likely probability of being selected). Priceline
then checks the prices that the hotel has loaded; each
property is allowed to load three rate classes (all
prices are loaded into a global distribution system).
If the selected property has a price p that is lower
than the consumer’s bid price pc, then a transaction
occurs. The hotel receives p, the customer pays pc,
and Priceline keeps pc − p as its share. If the property
has more than one room rate that is less than the
customer’s bid, the property receives the highest
price minus pc. For example, if a customer bids $100
and the selected property has loaded rates of $100,
$90, and $70, the customer pays $100, the property
receives $90, and Priceline receives $10.
If the property selected in this “ﬁrst round” does
not have a price such that p < pc, then Priceline goes
back to the n− 1 remaining properties; again, it ran-
domly selects a property and checks prices. In this
second round, each property’s probability of being
selected depends upon its success rate in the ﬁrst
round, i.e, the percentage of time when, based on ran-
dom selection, it has a price that is less than the cus-
tomer’s bid. A property that, when selected in the
ﬁrst round, has a rate in which p < pc 50 percent of
the time would have twice as likely a chance of being
randomly selected in the second round as one that has
a rate in which p < pc 25 percent of the time. Priceline
calculates this success rate (or batting average) based
only in the ﬁrst round, not on subsequent rounds.
It repeats rounds until it ﬁnds a property that meets
the customer’s bid or exhausts all properties, result-
ing in no sale. This mechanism favors the property
because it selects the highest price that yields Priceline
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a proﬁt. In addition, the random nature of property
selection does not require the properties to compete
with each other on price; they only compete with the
customer because a ﬁrm’s price relative to that of
another ﬁrm does not impact its probability of being
selected (at least in the ﬁrst round).
Opaque selling and the NYOP mechanism have
begun to generate interest in the academic litera-
ture, most of which has focused on its structure. Fay
(2004) develops a stylized model of a monopolist ﬁrm
that uses an NYOP channel and investigates whether
repeat bidding should be allowed. Although Priceline
does not allow repeat bidding within a 24-hour period,
there are numerous methods to circumvent this limita-
tion (http://www.BiddingforTravel.com shows exam-
ples). Fay (2004) indicates that partial repeat bidding,
i.e., repeat bidding by knowledgable customers, might
be less proﬁtable than complete repeat bidding. Hann
and Terwiesch (2003) use data from a European NYOP
retailer to investigate consumer transaction costs (i.e.,
the cost of resubmitting bids) of using a repeat-
bidding NYOP channel. In a related paper, Spann
et al. (2004) use data from a German NYOP seller
of ﬂights between Germany and Spain to investigate
consumer frictional or transaction costs and consumer
willingness to pay.
Wang et al. (2005) develop a game-theoretic model
of a supplier that uses both regular posted-price
full-information channels and NYOP channels to
reach heterogeneous customers. They develop a two-
stage game in which suppliers set posted prices
in period 1, observe demand in period 1, and set
minimally acceptable prices at the NYOP channel
in period 2. Posted prices are rigid in period 2. Con-
sumers observe posted prices in period 1 and then
decide to buy or bid in period 2. Because of the rigid-
ity of posted prices and the demand uncertainty, the
NYOP channel generates increased revenues for the
service provider.
Wilson and Zhang (2008) look at a retailer that sets
prices on an NYOP channel. They develop  opti-
mal policies for the retailer to encourage customers
to bid their maximum reservation price. In this paper,
we look at a less-stylized situation in which the re-
tailer posts multiple prices and must allocate inven-
tory across these price classes when customers are
arriving randomly.
Related research looks at opaque selling in which
prices are posted; however, some aspect of the ser-
vice or service provider is hidden from customers.
Jiang (2007) develops a Hotelling model (Hotelling
1929) to illustrate how a ﬁrm should price on reg-
ular full-information channels versus opaque chan-
nels. Jiang (2007) indicates that opaque selling can
be Pareto-improving for both customers and suppli-
ers when customers are differentiated based on their
willingness to pay. Jerath et al. (2007) also develop
a Hotelling model of opaque pricing. In their model,
two ﬁrms of equal capacity offer a differentiated ser-
vice using three channels: regular posted price, posted
last-minute sales, and last-minute sales through an
opaque intermediary. Their objective is to investigate
the market conditions under which a ﬁrm should
directly offer last-minute discounts versus offering
those discounts through an intermediary. Jerath et al.
(2007) relax the posted-price rigidity of Wang et al.
(2005) by introducing direct last-minute discounts.
They conclude that direct last-minute selling is prefer-
able to using the opaque intermediary if consumer
valuations are high or the service offerings are rela-
tively homogeneous.
Priceline gives daily activity reports to the service
providers who provide it with their prices and inven-
tory. In the following sections, we outline these activ-
ity reports and use the information in the reports
to develop optimal prices for ﬁrms to release to
Priceline. We use data from hotels; however, we could
generalize our method to all services that release
inventory via Priceline’s NYOP mechanism.
Modeling Approach
Understanding Bids on Priceline
In this section, we describe the development of a
model based on the customer bid data that Priceline
sends to ﬁrms each day. We use the bid data to create
demand distributions, which are a function of price.
In subsequent sections, we then structure a dynamic
program to determine the optimal prices to post on
Priceline, and the inventory allocation across these
prices. We illustrate our model development using
data from a Kimpton hotel in Washington, DC.
A customer bids on a room at Priceline by selecting
a city and a subarea within that city (e.g., New York
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and its subarea, Times Square), and a property quality
(e.g., two-star), and places a bid. Priceline determines
if it has a willing service provider at the requested
price. If the bid is successful, Priceline notiﬁes the
bidder of the speciﬁc property and charges the cus-
tomer’s credit card. If the bid is unsuccessful, the
customer may rebid on the same item (city, subarea,
star quality, and arrival and departure dates) after
24 hours; the customer can also alter the bid by chang-
ing any of the above features and rebid instantly. Each
property receives a daily bid report for the speciﬁc
market (e.g., city, subarea, and star quality) in which
the property is located (Figure 1).
The bid report shows all bids made the prior day for
all future arrival days (including the prior day). The
DAILY DEMAND REPORTAttn: Revenue manager
         Director of sales
         General manager
ALL CURRENCIES IN $USD
Room Nights = 108
Revenue = $6,828
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES ON 9/3/07
Date
Offered
RN
Booked
RN
Offered
revenue
Booked
revenue Conversion
Avg. offer
price
Avg. booked
price
09/03/07 108 $6,878 $64OPAQUE
Check in
date
Check in
day of
week
Length of
stay
Number of
rooms
Your
Priceline
rate* ($)
Offer price
($)
Declined
revenue
($)
Reason**
Booked
by
others
09/03/07 Mon 2 1 52 HI Y
09/05/07 Wed 3 1 45 HI
09/06/07 Thu 1 1 44 HI
09/07/07 Fri 2 1 48 HI Y
09/08/07 Sat 4 1 88 HI
09/09/07 Sun 4 1 88 HI
09/09/07 Sun 4 1 66 HI
09/13/07 Thu 7 1 46 HI
09/14/07 Fri 4 1 84 HI
09/15/07 Sat 4 1 66 HI
09/16/07 Sun 2 1
63
195
179
65
130
162
162
253
217
300
332 70 HI
09/16/07 Sun 3 1 70 NR
09/16/07 Sun 3 1 70 NR
09/16/07 Sun 1 1 195 61
104
135
44
96
352
352
264
322
336
264
140
210
210
61 HI
Figure 1: The table shows a sample daily report of customer bid data from Priceline.com.
∗If your Priceline rate changes during the requested length of stay, we will display the average of the available Priceline rates.
∗∗HI, your Priceline rate was higher than the customer’s offer price; NR, your hotel appeared sold out and did not display any rates. (Reasons not shown:
NP, your hotel did not display a Priceline rate though other non-Priceline rates were available; RR, a nonqualiﬁed rate equal to or less than the Priceline
rate was available at your property.)
report has a line for each bid posted by each customer.
It indicates how many days the customer requested to
stay (Length of stay), the number of rooms requested,
the hotel’s lowest rate (Your Priceline rate), the
customer’s bid (Offer price), and whether a competi-
tor accepted the bid (Booked by others). For example,
line 1 shows that a customer wanted to check in on
9/3 and stay for two nights; the hotel rejected the cus-
tomer’s $52 bid (its price was $63), but a competitor
accepted the bid. Firms can then combine these reports
from multiple days and use them to create a targeted
Priceline pricing strategy.
Arrival Distribution
Priceline can sort bids by arrival day and then by the
number of days prior to arrival (DBA) that the bid was
Anderson: Setting Prices on Priceline
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Figure 2: The graph shows the distribution of the average number of bids
placed at Priceline by days prior to arrival.
placed, thus creating arrival distributions. Figure 2
displays a sample arrival distribution; it shows the
average number of bids placed for Monday arrival
dates for up to 14 days prior to arrival. Demand for
services is seasonal; each day of the week (DOW) and
DBA have potentially different demand levels.
Given the discrete nature of the number of bids
placed, we use the Poisson distribution to model the
frequency of bid activity. Modeling bids by DBA as
Poisson distributions, we have
f x  = 
xe−
x!  (1)
where x is the number of bids placed and  is the
average number of bids placed for the arrival date
in question. Each DBA will have a different bid dis-
tribution because the number of bids placed usually
increases as the arrival date approaches. Similarly,
we model weekends (Friday and Saturday arrivals)
as different from weekdays because more business
travelers book weekday stays and more leisure travel-
ers book weekend stays. This segmentation in bid fre-
quency will be very service speciﬁc, with some hotels
or services allowing more or less aggregation of data,
i.e., potentially treating each weekday as its own seg-
ment. The number of bids placed does not necessar-
ily reﬂect the number of customers because allowing
customers to rebid 24 hours after an unsuccessful bid
could cause a demand overestimation.
DBA
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Weekend 123 133 84 63 55 39 24 17
Weekday 85 85 44 31 23 22 18 17
Table 1: The table data show the average number of bids placed per day
by days prior to arrival, and separated by weekdays and weekends.
Table 1 displays mean daily arrival rates for week-
day and weekend arrival dates as a function of the
number of days prior to arrival that the bids are
placed for this same property.
Bid Distribution
Similar to how they track the number of bids made,
ﬁrms can track the prices of the actual bids. Figure 3
displays a histogram of bids posted by customers
for same-day (DBA = 0) weekend arrival; Figure 4
displays a similar histogram for a weekday arrival.
Potentially, each DOW will have a different bid dis-
tribution by DBA, thus reﬂecting customers who will
potentially bid lower the further out they are from
their planned arrival date (because they will have
opportunities to rebid if unsuccessful). Kimpton’s
pricing strategy might induce changes in distributions
of bids because consumers might use secondary sites
(e.g., http://www.BiddingforTravel.com) to commu-
nicate bid successes and failures; therefore, the hotel
might need to update these distributions in the future
as it collects new data that reﬂect potential changes in
bid behavior.
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Figure 3: The graph shows the distribution of prices for customer bids on
Priceline for a weekend arrival at a Kimpton hotel.
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Figure 4: The graph shows the distribution of prices for customer bids on
Priceline for a weekday arrival at a Kimpton hotel.
Figures 3 and 4, in addition to showing the fre-
quency of bids by price, also display gamma proba-
bility density functions that are suitable to the data
and use maximum-likelihood estimators.
Demand as a Function of Price
In the following section, we develop demand distri-
butions using the data as summarized in the Under-
standing Bids on Priceline section. Let the size of the
customer base interested in placing a bid for a room
for a particular arrival date and particular DBA be
represented by the random variable N following a
Poisson distribution. Let FB, following a gamma dis-
tribution, represent the distribution function of cus-
tomer bids for a randomly selected customer posting
a bid (for the same arrival date and DBA). If the ser-
vice provider posts a price p, then anyone with a bid
greater than p would secure the room. The probabil-
ity that a randomly selected customer is willing to bid
more than p is 1−FBp. The bid distribution FB·, simi-
lar to the arrival distribution, might have separate dis-
tributions by DOW and DBA because customers might
bid less farther in advance, and bid higher for week-
days (assuming business demand) than for weekends
(leisure demand). In our example, we use separate bid
distributions for weekends and weekdays, but not by
DBA, because we are currently looking only at setting
prices for seven days prior to arrival.
To simplify the dynamic programming formulation
in the Determining Optimal Room Rates section, simi-
lar to Gerchak et al. (1985) and Lee and Hersh (1993),
we subdivide each DBA into T subperiods such that
the probability (following Poisson arrivals) that more
than one bid is placed within each subperiod is smaller
than . For an arrival date, the average number of bids
placed at j days in advance of arrival is j , then choose
Tj such that 1− fj0− fj1≤  where
fjx=
j/Tj
xe−j /Tj
x!  (2)
For a ﬁrm posting m prices to Priceline, let P ij be
the probability that a successful bid is made j DBA
for price i, i = 12    m. Without loss of generality,
assume pmj > p
m−1
j > · · ·> p1j . Then
Pmj = 1− FBpmj 	 · fj1 (3)
where fj1, as Equation (2) shows, is the probability
of a customer placing a bid, j DBA. This formulation is
similar to the single-product dynamic-pricing model
of Zhao and Zheng (2000), in which Ft  denotes the
cumulative probability distribution of customer reser-
vation prices. Then, 1− Ftp is the probability that a
customer arriving at time t would purchase an item
priced at p. The result is t1− Ftp	 as the demand
process for Poisson arrivals t.
Under our multiple price framework, for prices
m−1 to 1, the probability of a sale in period n becomes
P ij = FBpi+1j − FBpij 	 · fj1 i=m− 1    1 (4)
P 0j = 1−
∑m
i=1 P
i
j is the probability of no sale.
Determining Optimal Room Rates
A ﬁrm that releases a preset inventory to Priceline
has two sets of decisions to make: (1) the prices to
post and (2) the inventory allocation or booking lim-
its for each price. For a given arrival or check-in date
(departure date for an airline), the ﬁrm must set prices
and allocations for each day prior to arrival. It sets
prices and allocations on each DBA, knowing that it
can revise these prices and allocations at each subse-
quent DBA prior to arrival, and accomplishes setting
these prices and allocations via backward induction
and dynamic programming. Let V Tr jpj represent
the expected value for a ﬁrm releasing r rooms to
Priceline at period j days before arrival with DBA
j subdivided into T decision periods, and with pj
the vector of m prices for DBA j . A request for rate
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class i in subperiod t, where t = 12     T , will only
be accepted if pij + V t−1r−1 jpj ≥ V t−1r jpj. V t−1r j −
V t−1r−1 jpj represents the expected opportunity cost
of the rth room in decision period t of DBA j . For
ﬁxed prices, pj, Lee and Hersh (1993) show that
V t−1r jpj − V t−1r−1 jpj is nonincreasing in r for a
given t and nondecreasing in t given an r . This mono-
tonicity results in the determination of critical values
for r and n for which inventory is restricted from rate
class i. Because of the monotonicity if a price class
is closed, all lower-priced classes are closed; i.e., it
allows the determination of booking limits or alloca-
tions across the m rate classes with prices pj.
The expected revenue V tr jpj can be expressed as
V tr jpj = P 0j V t−1r jpj+ Pmj pmj +V t−1r−1 jpj	
+
m−1∑
i=1
P ij max
[
pij +V t−1r−1 jpjV t−1r jpj
]
for r > 0 t > 0 (5)
with V 0r 0p0 = 0 and V 0r jpj = V Tr j − 1pj−1 for
all r . The ﬁrst term on the right side of Equa-
tion (5), P 0j V
t−1
r jpj, is the expected revenue from
no bids being placed in period t, i.e., the revenue
with the same inventory and one fewer opportu-
nity to sell it—V t−1r jpj multiplied by the probabil-
ity of no sale. The second term, Pmj p
m
j + V t−1r−1 jpj	,
is the expected revenue from selling a room at the
ﬁrm’s highest posted price, pmj , in period t with r −
1 rooms to sell in period t − 1, and Pmj the proba-
bility that a bid is placed at a price ≥ pmj . The third
term,
∑m−1
i=1 P
i
j maxp
i
j + V t−1r−1 jpjV t−1r jpj	, is the
expected value across all remaining m− 1 prices. The
expected value is the product of the probability of a
request at each price P ij , and the max of accepting
the request at price pij plus the value of having one
fewer room in the remaining periods V t−1r−1 jpj and
not accepting the request, and having all r rooms in
the next t− 1 periods V t−1r jpj.
The above formulation gives the optimal expected
value for a given set of prices, with V t−1r j−V t−1r−1 jpj
used to calculate optimal booking limits. For ﬁrms that
load a single set of rates to Priceline daily (as is com-
mon practice), optimal prices can be determined by
searching over the vector of prices pj for ∗V Tr jpj,
where ∗V Tr jpj=maxpj V Tr jpj. This search is quite
feasible because Kimpton only posts three rate classes,
and its prices are usually only whole numbers. Our
experience shows that performing this search and the
resulting optimal price and booking limit determina-
tion take only a few minutes on a standard desk-
top computer for a model implemented in Excel and
coded in Visual Basic for Applications.
Opportunity Cost of a Room
Because Priceline is only one of several distribu-
tion channels that ﬁrms use to sell inventory, it
cannot set its prices in isolation. Firms can integrate
a Priceline pricing strategy into their overall inven-
tory or revenue-management strategy by considering
the opportunity cost of releasing rooms on Priceline.
The deterministic linear program is a common form
of inventory control in many revenue-management
approaches (Liu and van Ryzin 2008) and is especially
relevant for hotel revenue management. The deter-
ministic LP is
V x=max pT y
s.t. Ay ≤ x
0≤ y ≤

(6)
where the decision variables, y = y1y2     yn, rep-
resent allocations of capacity across n product classes
(for a property, these product classes are different rate
classes and lengths of stay) at rates p with demand 

and available capacity x. As Talluri and van Ryzin
(2004) discuss, ﬁrms often use the dual variables 
associated with capacity constraints x. The dual vari-
ables represent the marginal value of capacity and
provide an estimate of the opportunity cost of releas-
ing inventory on Priceline (and making it unavailable
to other distribution channels). Forecasted demand 

is updated regularly as new reservations are received;
Weatherford and Kimes (2002) provide details on
hotel room forecasting.
The number of rooms to release to Priceline can
be evaluated by comparing the expected marginal
value of rooms released to Priceline to the shadow
price  of the capacity constraint for the arrival
day in question from the deterministic LP. The
ﬁrm can continue to release rooms to Priceline if
∗V Tr jpj − ∗V Tr−1jpj > , where ∗V Tr jpj is the
optimal expected value at DBA j if r rooms are
released to Priceline, and ∗V Tr−1jpj is the optimal
expected value if only r − 1 rooms are released.
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Decision period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 108 110 112 114 115 117 118 119 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 127
2 84 86 88 90 92 93 94 96 97 99 100 101 103 104 105 107
3 64 67 70 73 75 78 80 82 83 85 86 88 89 90 91 92
4 49 51 54 57 59 61 64 66 68 71 73 75 77 78 80 82
5 33 36 40 44 47 49 52 54 56 57 59 61 63 65 67 69
Accept only class 3 ($142) Accept class 2 and 3 ($92 and $142)
Accept all classes ($55, $92, and $142)
Ca
pa
cit
y
Figure 5: This table illustrates expected marginal room values and corresponding optimal inventory policies for
a Kimpton hotel.
Illustrative Example
Figures 3 and 4 and Table 1 are used to determine
the probability of a request P ij , given a price pi, j days
prior to arrival. The following section illustrates these
calculations for a weekday arrival for prices posted to
Priceline on the arrival day.
For Poisson arrivals with a mean of 85 (from
Table 1, DBA = 0 for weekdays) per day and
P [number requests ≥ 2 < 01 from Equation (2)], the
DBA must be subdivided into 16 decision periods.
Then, for prices p0 = p3 p2 p1= $142$92$55with
bids following a gamma distribution with parameters
3.37, 29 results in probability of requests P 01 = 00568
using Equation (3), P 02 = 00900 P 03 = 00965 using
Equation (4), where the probability of a request f1 in
Equations (3) and (4) is calculated assuming Poisson
arrivals with mean arrivals of 85/16 per decision
period.
Figure 5 displays the expected opportunity costs,
V t−1r 0p0−V t−1r−1 0p0, for inventory levels up to ﬁve
rooms across the 16 decision periods. These oppor-
tunity costs can then be used to determine optimal
inventory policies for the ﬁve rooms potentially being
released, i.e., how many rooms should be available
at each of the three prices. The policies are critical
capacity-time (decision-period) pairs indicating when
a price class is open. The prices, p0 = $142$92$55,
are determined by searching V Tr 0p0 over all possi-
ble prices p0.
Impact
Perfect experiments to test the effectiveness of a new
pricing or inventory strategy do not exist as they do
in science laboratories. To estimate model effective-
ness and because of seasonality in most service set-
tings, ﬁrms commonly use year-to-year comparisons;
i.e., they compare a given date to the same date of the
prior year (e.g., the third Monday in September 2008
and the third Monday in September 2007). To eval-
uate model performance, we used the model to
compare Priceline prices for a Kimpton hotel in
Washington, DC to a similar Kimpton property also
in Washington, DC, but priced as usual to serve as an
additional form of comparison. For the second prop-
erty, we used its current revenue-management sys-
tem (all properties use the same vendor-developed
revenue-management system) to provide Priceline
rates.
Since the model’s introduction, rooms sold via
Priceline increased 11 percent between 2007 and 2008;
the average rate for these rooms increased 3.7 per-
cent. This compares to a price reduction of 8 percent
on other electronic distribution channels to maintain
regular sales volumes. Room rates in the base case
property and sold on Priceline declined by 40 percent;
Priceline rates also decreased by 3.7 percent, and reg-
ular electronic distribution channel prices declined by
9.5 percent. Although we cannot report on the statis-
tical signiﬁcance of the differences given the ad hoc
nature of the comparison, the results are encourag-
ing because the model has increased Priceline volume
and prices simultaneously while not adversely affect-
ing other channel prices.
Conclusions and Limitations
We have outlined some details of the allocation of
inventory on the NYOP mechanism that Priceline
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uses. The unique nature of its process for selecting
the service provider and the price paid to that service
provider requires novel approaches to the inventory-
allocation decision. Using real data from Kimpton
Hotels, we have illustrated how Priceline can use
these data to set optimal prices and inventory policies.
Our example illustrates how a ﬁrm used Priceline to
improve its volume and prices, even in a market in
which regular prices are declining.
The current formulation is monopolistic in nature
because it does not include any analysis of the prob-
ability that Priceline selects a speciﬁc ﬁrm. Including
this factor would require the ﬁrm to have some insight
into the number of competitive ﬁrms that also use the
NYOP mechanism because Priceline’s ﬁrst random-
selection process uses NYOP. In addition, the mecha-
nism is also relevant to the pricing decision because
it is necessary to determine each ﬁrm’s success rate
in the ﬁrst round; Priceline uses this success rate in
subsequent rounds. Excluding the selection probabil-
ity from the formulation, given that it is partially price
dependent, might result in overestimating expected
revenues (and the resulting prices). We leave this inter-
esting aspect of the problem for future investigation.
Last, the bid reports that ﬁrms receive do not allow
them to distinguish between bidders or identify repeat
bidding. The use of travel websites, such as http://
www.BiddingforTravel.com, could exacerbate repeat
bidding because they provide forums that allow cus-
tomers to discuss bid success. Excluding repeat bid-
ding overestimates demand and might be an issue
for ﬁrms that receive few bids; these are often lower-
valued service providers, such as one-star hotels. This
is less of an issue for three- to ﬁve-star hotels, such as
Kimpton, because they receive considerably more bids
than the rooms they allocate to Priceline.
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Sarita A. Moore, Area Director of Revenue Manage-
ment, Kimpton Hotels & Restaurants, 1315 16th Street,
NW, Washington, DC 20036, writes: “I am writing this
letter in support of the research that Professor Ander-
son has provided Kimpton Hotels & Restaurants. We
have been using Professor Anderson’s model to set
rates and room availability of our hotels for several
months. The model has greatly improved our under-
standing of Priceline’s name-your-own-price distribu-
tion channel as well as improved our revenue and
sales through Priceline.”
